Sellers often make explicit or implicit product claims without providing evidence.
["Puffery" is ] frequently used to denote the exaggerations reasonably to be expected of a seller as to the degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of which cannot be precisely determined. -Federal Trade Commission 1 
Introduction
Much of seller communication is mere "puffery" that makes subjective claims about product attributes that are difficult or impossible to verify. Salespeople assure customers that a tie "looks great" or that a car "drives well". Advertisements claim that a pizza has "better ingredients" or that a lipstick is "long-lasting". More generally, sellers may emphasize the stylishness or sportiness of a product or try to make other favorable associations that are inherently subjective. Studies find that most advertisements contain subjective claims, and that many advertisements contain no objective facts (Stewart and Furse, 1986; Abernethy and Franke, 1996) . 2 It is often argued that puffery by salespeople and advertisers is only useful to the seller if it successfully dupes a credulous buyer (e.g., Preston, 1996; Hoffman, 2006) . But the argument that puffery is unambiguously bad seems at odds with the right to engage in puffery being supported by both common law and nearly a century of regulatory law. 3 Moreover, some puffery is so extreme that even a naive buyer is unlikely to take it seriously -stores proclaim that "our service can't be beat", restaurants boast of "the world's best hotdogs", and salespeople claim that a shirt "looks perfect". When seller claims are not taken at face value, might they still communicate useful information to buyers? To gain insight into long-standing questions about the effects of puffery, we analyze seller communication about unverifiable product attributes. We develop a discrete choice model where the buyer has private information about her preferences and the seller has private information about his product that can help the buyer make a better decision. The information is subjective (or otherwise unverifiable) so there is no way to directly prove the information to the buyer. We show how puffery can be informative in that it credibly uct but who value that attribute, and some of them then go to the seller instead. It also pushes some customers to the competitor's product who value attributes that have not been criticized. While credible and effective, it may seem that highlighting a competitor's weakness would be less effective than highlighting one's own strength, and this is true in our numerical example of a standard logit model with symmetric preferences.
Combining the case of puffery about one's own product with that of negative puffery about a competitor's product, we then consider puffery that highlights the comparative advantage of a firm's product, i.e., that highlights which attribute is best relative to that of a competitor. Such comparative advantage puffery, which could be verbal communication by a salesperson or a form of comparative advertising, can be doubly powerful in that it pulls in customers who value one attribute while simultaneously pushing them away from the competitor. We show that it helps the seller when the competitor's probability of a sale is sufficiently large (or the seller's probability of a sale is sufficiently small). For instance, the classic "We try harder" ad campaign of Avis is an example of comparative advertising by a smaller firm that is about a service attribute of the product.
These results depend on there being some heterogeneity in consumer preferences, either because the seller is communicating to multiple buyers at once, or because the seller is communicating to one buyer whose type is unknown. 5 If this heterogeneity disappears because the seller can learn the exact type of individual buyers and communicate to them separately, then the seller has an incentive to emphasize whatever attribute each buyer values more. Such "pandering" is completely discounted by buyers so that in equilibrium there is no net effect from seller communication on the buyer's probability of purchasing the product. 6 Hence greater information about a buyer's preferences, or better ability to communicate separately to different buyers with different preferences, can paradoxically hurt the seller by undermining the persuasiveness of communication.
We focus on puffery by a seller trying to sell a single good, which would seem to be a less favorable environment for persuasive communication than when the seller has multiple goods to offer a buyer. As previously shown in the literature, if the seller has at least two products there can be an equilibrium tradeoff where recommending one product increases the probability that it is sold, but also decreases the probability that another of the seller's products is sold. Such comparative cheap talk can benefit the seller by reducing the probability that 5 This builds on the early idea that multiple audiences can often facilitate communication in a onedimensional cheap talk model (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989) . 6 Pandering is analyzed by Che, Dessein and Kartik (2013) in the related context of recommendations between multiple actions, e.g., a seller's recommendation to buy one good over another.
the buyer walks away without buying either product (Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2010; Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012; Che, Dessein, and Kartik, 2013) . Applying this idea to puffery, a restaurant's claim to have "the world's best hotdogs" might not convince people that its hotdogs are really the best, but it can credibly convey that its hotdogs are not as bad as its hamburgers. Such a claim is effectively a product recommendation that increases seller profits by decreasing the probability that a potential diner fails to stop for either hotdogs or hamburgers. 7 It may seem that if communication via puffery (cheap talk) helps a seller then communication based on verifiable statements ("disclosure" or "persuasion") must be even better, but this is not the case. First, communication via puffery has a favorable impact on buyer impressions of one attribute and a negative impact on impressions of another attribute, whereas communication of verifiable information sometimes reveals bad information on both attributes. By the unraveling argument for verifiable information (e.g., Milgrom, 1981) , which is generalized to multiple dimensions by Koessler and Renault (2012) , all verifiable information will be disclosed in equilibrium in our context. Therefore seller types with bad information on both attributes are hurt by disclosure of verifiable information but can still benefit from puffery. Second, puffery sometimes strikes the right balance between revealing some information but not too much information, so that it is better on average for the seller than full disclosure of information. We illustrate this in Section 5.3 in an example that links attribute puffery with product recommendations.
This paper provides the first results on cheap talk about choice attributes in standard discrete choice models such as the logit and probit. Beyond the particular issue of seller puffery, the results apply more generally to discrete choice models in a wide range of areas such as managerial decision making, voting, and lobbying. We find that expert uncertainty over the decision maker's preferences, as captured by a standard random coefficients model, is both necessary and sufficient for communication to be influential when the expert is pushing one particular choice. Informative cheap talk then increases the dispersion of the decision maker's estimated value of the expert's preferred choice. If the probability that this choice is taken is a convex function of this estimated value, this increased dispersion raises the probability of the decision maker taking the choice. This is the case in standard discrete choice models when the prior probability of the choice being taken is low. 7 Alternatively, this can be modeled as a nested discrete choice problem where the restaurant's hotdogs and hamburgers are effectively two attributes of the restaurant. See Section 5.3 for an application of this approach.
Literature Review
This paper contributes to the recent literature on how sellers can provide information about product attributes that facilitates a better match between buyer interests and products (e.g., Renault, 2006, 2009; Johnson and Myatt, 2006; Sun, 2011; and Anand and Shachar, 2011) . We show that, when buyer preferences are uncertain, puffery about unverifiable soft information rather than just disclosure of verifiable hard information can facilitate such matching. Hence the results from this literature focusing on verifiable information are more general than previously recognized.
The idea that puffery of one attribute might be persuasive when puffery of every attribute is not persuasive was examined by Kamins and Marks (1987) . They consider puffery as part of a "two-sided argument" in which one product attribute is explicitly conceded to be weak so as to increase the credibility of claims regarding the featured attribute. 8 They find that such puffery is believed by experimental subjects and interpret the result as evidence that puffery can be successful at deceiving consumers. We model the same insight that puffery about one of multiple attributes can be persuasive, but in our model rational consumers receive useful information from the seller's decision to push a particular attribute. Puffery of an attribute in our model can be counterbalanced by an explicit concession as in the two-sided arguments literature, or it can be counterbalanced by an implicit concession whereby consumers correctly infer that unmentioned attributes are not the product's relative strength. This implicit tradeoff is consistent with the "discount effect" identified in the empirical literature in which consumers respond to a favorable statement about one attribute by updating positively on that attribute and negatively on attributes that are omitted (see the discussion in Kardes, Posavac, and Cronley, 2004) . The phenomenon has been explained in terms of negative correlations in the attributes (e.g., Huber and McCann, 1982 ). In our model even if the underlying attributes are positively correlated there is negative correlation in the updated estimates since puffery of one attribute raises the updated estimate of that attribute above the prior and lowers the updated estimate of the other attribute below the prior.
The result that communication benefits a firm when a sale is unlikely is consistent with 8 The literature on two-sided arguments dates to the analysis of propaganda strategies (Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield, 1949) . The marketing literature typically explains the enhanced credibility of two-sided arguments by attribution theory -a buyer is less likely to attribute a seller's intentions to that of just making a sale when some negative information is provided. Our results show that credibility is still possible even when the buyer thinks the seller's only intention is to make a sale.
anecdotal evidence that puffery is most common by firms with weak market position (Preston, 1996) , and with the finding that comparative advertising is most useful for new and small firms (Pechmann and Stewart, 1991; Grewal et al., 1997) . It is also consistent with longstanding experimental results that two-sided arguments increase purchase intent only when purchase intentions are initially weak (e.g., Crowley and Hoyer, 1994) . The underlying mechanism that higher variation in buyer valuations helps when valuations are low also fits findings by Sun (2012) that higher variance of product reviews helps when a product's average ratings are low. In our model with multiple product attributes, if a product is strong on one dimension and weak on another dimension then buyer valuations will vary more and some buyers will buy the product even if overall valuations are low.
9
A recent theoretical literature considers comparative advertising when information is verifiable or potentially so. Anderson and Renault (2009) analyze comparative information that must be accurate, Barigozzi, Garella, and Peitz (2009) analyze comparative information that a competitor can challenge or not in court, and Emons and Fluet (2012) analyze comparative information where exaggerations are costly in that they might be penalized. Our cheap talk approach shows that the insights from these models can often be extended to the case where information is not verifiable. In particular Anderson and Renault (2009) show that small firms have the strongest incentive to reveal information about a competitor and we find the same result in our setting. 10 As long as there are at least two attributes, even if they are both vertical attributes valued to some extent by all buyers, sales can rise due to disclosure of comparative information by pure puffery. Our analysis of comparative advantage puffery adds to the understanding of how firms can create a "unique selling proposition" that differentiates a key attribute of the product from the competition (Reeves, 1961) . Every firm must have a comparative advantage in some attribute relative to another firm that it can credibly use puffery to highlight even if the advantage cannot be directly proven. Just as trade based on comparative advantage helps both sides, we find that comparative advertising based on a unique selling proposition for one firm can implicitly highlight the comparative advantage of the competing firm to the benefit of both firms and buyers.
That sellers can credibly communicate soft information is important in view of debates in the empirical literature about the content of advertising. The standard Resnik and Stern 9 Sun (2012) uses a Hotelling model of differentiated preferences along a line that predicts lower quality goods have greater variance in buyer valuations. 10 In their model prices are endogenous so there is the extra consideration of how the equilibrium of the pricing game changes with comparative advertising.
(1977) methodology for measuring advertising content includes any information about objective product attributes even if it is not supported by evidence, but excludes subjective information. This paper's results support the idea that even "cheap talk" about objective information can be credible and informative, but also imply that excluding subjective information can underestimate the amount of information in advertisements. In fact, the results imply that the mere choice to focus on one aspect of a product or not in an advertisement can provide real information.
11
We show how information about the relative quality of different product attributes can be communicated through puffery when buyer preferences are uncertain. The prior literature on cheap talk in advertising has shown how a connection between perceived quality and pricing can make seller statements about overall quality credible. Bagwell and Ramey (1993) find that cheap talk claims of high quality can be credible when a seller of a low quality good does not want to scare away low-income buyers who correctly anticipate that high quality will imply a high price. Gardete (2013) extends this analysis to allow for a range of different qualities and finds that low quality firms will often pool with slightly better firms, so that their quality claims are to some extent exaggerated. In these models cheap talk is only influential if it is transmitted before the price and the price is expected to vary with quality. In our approach cheap talk is influential even if prices are fixed.
12
As long recognized in the literature, reputational concerns can provide a break on seller incentives to mislead. The reputational costs of lying in a cheap talk model can be captured implicitly by a limited bias as in Crawford and Sobel (1982) , by explicit treatment of reputation over multiple interactions as in Sobel (1986) , by a reduced form future cost from current exaggerations as in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) and Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) , by complementarity of preferences across dimensions as in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) , and by incorporation of lying costs as in Kartik (2009) . In our model the seller does not face implicit or explicit future costs from being caught lying, but instead faces an immediate opportunity cost of pushing one attribute because any such message lowers buyer impressions of another attribute. 11 Relatedly, the literature on targeted advertising has shown that the choice to focus advertisements on one consumer segment or another, such as by choosing media that reach different types of consumers, reveals information about a product (Anand and Shachar, 2009 ). 12 The model in Section II.D of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) allows for comparative cheap talk about a vertical attribute and a horizontal attribute of a product, but cheap talk still does not in general provide additional information independent of the price if the price is known.
Example
Following a standard discrete choice model, suppose a buyer is considering product  at price   with value   +   where
The seller knows the product attribute qualities ( 1   2 ) and the buyer knows their own preferences ( 1   2 ). Suppose for now  = 1 and the only choice is to buy the product or not. The value to not buying is  0 +  0 where  0 = 0 and the noise shocks   and  0 are independently distributed and known only to the buyer. For simplicity suppose it is equally likely that either attribute is the strength of the product -either the quality of the first attribute is 3 and the quality of the second attribute is 1, or the opposite, ( 11   12 ) equals (3 1) or (1 3). And it is equally likely that the buyer values the first or second attribute more, ( 1   2 ) equals (3 1) or (1 3). The price is fixed at  1 = 10.
Without any communication from the seller,
] to the first type of buyer is  1 = 3(2) + 1 (2) − 10 = −2 and to the second type of buyer is  1 = 1(2) + 3(2) − 10 = −2. If the seller credibly indicates that attribute 1 is better, then these expected values for the two types are respectively  1 = 3(3) + 1(1) − 10 = 0 and  1 = 1(3)+3(1)− 10 = −4, and if the seller credibly indicates that attribute 2 is better, they are  1 = 3(1) + 1(3) − 10 = −4 and  1 = 3(3) + 1(1) − 10 = 0. Notice that from the seller's perspective it has the same effect to indicate that either attribute is better. Hence, even without reputational or other factors that are likely to give an extra incentive for honesty, the seller has no incentive to lie and claim that the worse attribute is really the product's strength, so puffing up one attribute at the expense of the other is credible. Now consider when puffery is persuasive in that it raises the likelihood of a sale. Since  1 is linear in the seller's information, it might seem that good news about the product will raise the probability of a sale just as much as bad news will lower it, so that the impact from revealing good news on one attribute and bad news on the other is zero. But this ignores the non-linearities induced by the distributions of  1 and  0 . Assuming that they follow Gumbel distributions as in the logit model, the probability of a sale is
which has the familiar S-shape in Figure 1 . In particular, for this case of two choices
For this example if there is no communication then
in the convex region. Communication of which attribute is the product's strength increases Figure 1 : Effect of Puffery on Probability of a Sale the variation in buyer valuations since some buyer types like the product more and others like it less than their prior expectations. Therefore, by application of Jensen's inequality, this variation helps the seller when the probability of a sale is in the lower convex region. In this example, the type of buyer who cares more about the attribute revealed to be better has expected value  1 = 0 so buys with probability  1 =  0 (1 +  0 ) = 5, while the type of buyer who cares more about the other attribute has expected value  1 = −4 so buys with probability
Therefore the expected probability of a sale is (5 + 024)2 = 262, which is over twice the probability without communication.
Notice from Figure 1 that  1 is concave for higher ranges of  1 , implying that communication which increases variation in  1 hurts rather than helps the seller. In this case the consumer is already likely to buy a product, so the seller is best off remaining silent rather than risk losing the sale. For instance, if consumers have stronger preferences for the product attributes (the ranges of  1 and  2 are higher) or if the attributes are more likely to be of high quality (the ranges of  1 and  2 are higher) then this is the case. If the cost of production is low so that the price   is low then this is also the case. 13 Since the probability of a sale can also be interpreted as the share of potential buyers who buy the product, the convex-concave shape of the logit model captures the intuition that when market share is low there is a large pool of potential buyers who are not currently 13 In this example, setting  = 10 is optimal with puffery for a marginal cost of  = 8. Note that without puffery a lower price of about 92 is optimal. We endogenize the price in Section 5.2.
buying and might be enticed by good news about one of the attributes, and not many current buyers who are buying and might be pushed away by bad news about the other attribute. Conversely, when market share is high, good news about an attribute pulls in fewer buyers than bad news about the other attribute pushes away. So the seller benefits from puffery when market share is low but is hurt when market share is high.
This example imposes the simplifying assumptions that the coefficients and attributes have symmetric distributions with perfect negative correlation, that there is only one product the buyer is considering, that the price is fixed, and that the noise parameters are consistent with the logit model. In our following analysis these assumptions are relaxed. Some attributes might be more important than others, buyers might already expect one attribute to be stronger than the other, the two attribute qualities might be positively correlated or have any other dependent distribution, there might be multiple goods under consideration, the seller might choose to adjust the price in light of communication possibilities, and the noise parameters may follow any logconcave distribution. Nevertheless the same result holds -puffery is credible and persuasive as long as there are at least two attributes, the buyer's preferences  are not perfectly known by the seller, and the probability of a sale is low.
The Model
Building on the standard discrete choice model introduced above, suppose that consumer utility from product  sold by seller  is   +   . We assume
is a vector that describes the  attributes of product  = 1      and  specifies the marginal utilities (buyer preferences) of the different attributes. The vector   includes known attributes such as the price of the product, and includes attributes which the buyer does not know the exact value of, e.g., the ease of use of the product or its durability.
The seller of product  possesses private information about the first 2 or more elements of the attribute vector   . The seller may also possess information about elements of the attribute vector   of another product. The preferences  are random coefficients that are the private information of the buyer. These coefficients capture the case of a single buyer of unknown type, or of multiple buyers of known types who all receive the same message. From the perspective of buyers, the prior distribution  of  = ( 1        ) has full support on a bounded convex set with a nonempty interior. And from the perspective of the seller, the prior distribution  of  has full support on a bounded convex set with a nonempty interior. We allow for possible dependence among the attribute qualities , and also among the coefficients , but assume both are independent of each other and independent of the 's. Let  represent the distribution of the i.i.d.   , which we assume to have corresponding logconcave density function  with support on the real line. The distributions  , , and  are common knowledge.
The buyer may purchase any one of the  ≥ 1 possible products with  = 0 the no purchase option. Let   denote the buyer's expectation of   given all available information so these estimates and the idiosyncratic shocks   determine the probability with which a product is purchased. We normalize the value of the no purchase option to  0 = 0. The probability that product  = 1      is purchased is then
The seller sends a costless, unverifiable message to the buyer  ∈ { 1     } where
A communication strategy for the seller specifies which message is sent as a function of the state . The buyer estimates the expected values of  given the prior distribution, the seller's strategy, and the seller's message . Representing these prior estimates by  = [], let the buyer's updated estimates given message
Since the buyer's utility for product  is linear in   these expected values are the only feature of the distribution of  that matter to buyers. Assuming that every message is used in equilibrium, 14 a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of this cheap talk game is fully specified by the seller's communication strategy mapping  to { 1     }. We assume the price   is fixed and the constant unit cost of production   is state-independent so the seller's payoff is proportional to the expected value of the probability of a sale,
for  = 1  , where we have integrated over the random coefficients  since they are the private information of the buyer. The error terms   are also the buyer's private information and are already incorporated into the definition of   . A communication strategy is a cheap talk equilibrium if the seller has no incentive to deviate by sending a message inconsistent with the strategy. Given that there is no cost to lying, the seller of good  must be indifferent between every message so the equilibrium condition is
Following standard results, we will show that a cheap talk equilibrium always exists in this game that affects the buyer's estimates of the attribute qualities. Therefore our main concern is when such communication is persuasive. As seen from the logit example in Figure  1 , the key to persuasiveness is the shape of   . The following properties hold for all i.i.d.   with logconcave density functions and support on the real line. This class includes the Gumbel distribution that the logit model is based on, the normal distribution that the probit model is based on, and most other standard distributions. Proofs of these properties, and of subsequent Propositions, are in the Appendix.
Shape Properties of   : The probability of a sale   is, for
We will show that revealing information about   via puffery increases variation in   , so these shape properties determine the effect of such information on the probability of a sale. Property (i) implies that, consistent with Figure 1 ,  1 is first convex and then at some point concave in  1 . 15 We will use this result to show that the insight from the introductory example that puffery helps when the probability of a sale is small extends generally. Property (ii) implies that  1 is instead concave-convex in  2 . We will use this property to find a corresponding result that negative puffery of an attribute of a competitor's product helps when the probability of a sale by the competitor is large. Properties (i) and (ii) do not imply that  1 is necessarily convex in ( 1   2 ) over some range, and instead Property (iii) rules this out. As we will see, Property (iii) implies that to ensure that puffery affecting buyer estimates of the values of both the seller's product and a competitor's product helps rather than hurts the seller, it must convey to buyers which attribute is the comparative advantage of the product. 16 Our results on the persuasiveness of puffery will not depend directly on the exact number of products and the exact number of product attributes, but only indirectly via how these factors affect the probability of a sale. For concreteness we will focus on the case of two 15 As with the logit,   is always S-shaped for the probit. For general logconcave densities if   1 then   might have more than one inflection point, but convexity (concavity) still holds for   low (high) enough. 16 The convexity and concavity results are also relevant for other forms of communication such as product samples, third-party reviews, or quality certificates. We focus on ranges of   where convexity or concavity holds so Jensen's inequality applies directly. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) examine the optimal partial disclosure policy when the sender's payoff includes both convex and concave regions.
firms,  = 2, two unknown attributes, ( 1  2 ), and a single known attribute, the price   . We assume that the seller sells product  = 1 and has private information about the first two attributes of its product and of a competing product  = 2.
Attribute Puffery
We first consider attribute puffery that, as in the introductory example, only affects buyer estimates of attributes of the seller's product ( 11   12 ). For communication to be informative, it must change the buyer's estimates of attribute quality, and different messages must change the estimates in different ways so as to create a tradeoff between sending one message or another. Given a message   the buyer's estimates of the seller's attributes
while the estimates of the competitor's at-
If  and  are symmetrically distributed, as was true in the introductory example, then clearly the seller has no incentive to lie about which attribute is better. If buyers tend to care more about one of the attributes, buyers can "discount" puffery for that attribute so that the relative incentive to push the attribute is weakened to the point that lying is no longer worthwhile. For instance, suppose the support of the distribution of  1 is above that of  2 . This gives the seller an incentive to push attribute 1 rather than attribute 2. But if buyers are correctly suspicious of such a claim and heavily discount it, then the seller is instead better off pushing attribute 2. By the intermediate value theorem, there must be some intermediate degree of discounting that eliminates the seller's incentive to always push attribute 1 without creating an incentive to instead always push attribute 2. 17 In particular,
by Theorem 1 of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010), since the seller's (expert's) preferences do not depend on the state  and are continuous in the buyer's (decision maker's) estimates 17 In equilibrium this discounting ensures the seller is just indifferent between lying or not. In practice the seller is likely to face some reputational or other costs to lying that give a strict incentive to tell the truth once the discounting has sufficiently reduced the gains from lying. These can be captured by adding a direct cost of lying as in Kartik (2007) , or by assuming some alignment of the seller's preferences with the buyer's preferences across dimensions as in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) .
, the appropriate degree of discounting can always ensure that the seller's incentive to lie is eliminated and an informative equilibrium exists. 18 An informative equilibrium is influential if it changes buyer behavior. In equilibrium, attribute puffery pushes up the buyer's estimate for one attribute  1 and pushes down the buyer's estimate for another attribute  1 , but since the buyer's preferences  vary, the tradeoff for each different type of buyer is not exact. Some buyers end up with a higher  1 and some buyers with a lower  1 , which creates a mean preserving spread in  1 . If  1 is convex in  1 , this raises the average probability of a sale for any given . Therefore, integrating over all the , the expected probability of a sale  1 rises. Conversely, if  1 is concave in  1 then  1 falls.
The following proposition formalizes this argument. Since a rational buyer is always better off from more information, we focus on the gain to the seller in this and subsequent results. 19 Proposition 1 Attribute puffery by seller  always strictly raises (lowers) the expected probability of a sale   if the probability of a sale   () without communication is sufficiently small (large) for all . Figure 2 (a). We assume that the attribute qualities for the competitor's good  2 are uniform i.i.d. on [110 1110] so the competitor's good is known to be of higher quality on average,
In this example the seller has no reason to "lie" by puffing up the wrong attribute since pushing either attribute will have the same effect on the probability of a sale. This is seen from the seller's indifference curves representing the combinations of buyer estimates of  11 and  12 that give the same expected probability of a sale   (  ). Since the same indifference The gain from communication is seen from the shape of these indifference curves. Because the other product is better on average the probability of a sale without communication is low, so  1 is convex in  1 . Puffery changes the estimates of ( 11   12 ) from the prior  1 = (12 12) to the updated estimates either  1 1 = (23 13) or  2 1 = (13 23), which in either case increases dispersion in  1 =  1  11 +  2  12 . As seen in the figure, the resulting probability of a sale is higher for either message than from the prior. 20 In this example the overall probability of a sale rises from 59% to 109%. In any cheap talk game such as this there is also a "babbling equilibrium" which is completely uninformative in that the receiver believes that the messages are uncorrelated with the sender's information and so the sender has no incentive to make the messages correlated. Such an equilibrium leads to buyer purchase probabilities that are the same as the priors so our above discussion about the gains from puffery can also be interpreted as the gains from an informative cheap talk equilibrium relative to the babbling equilibrium. 21 We have focused discussion on the simplest case of a two-message equilibrium, but other 20 The "bowed outward" shape implies the seller's preferences are quasiconvex, which from Theorem 2 of Chakraborty and Harbaugh implies the seller benefits from communication. Our proof strategy here is to use convexity of  1 in  1 , which implies convexity (and hence quasiconvexity) of  1 in ( 11   12 ). 21 All seller types benefit equally when the probability of a sale is low, and the buyer always benefits from more information given a fixed price, so a Pareto dominance argument can be made for communication relative to babbling. Neither the "natural language refinement" of Farrell (1993) nor the NITS refinement of Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) refine the equilibria set in our model. equilibria can also exist. Our results on persuasiveness of puffery extend to all influential cheap talk equilibria. For a low probability of a sale there always exist more informative equilibria which involve additional messages that further subdivide, possibly with mixing, the two regions in Figure 2(a) . 22 Equilibrium messages indicating that both attributes are better on average than the prior are possible since the seller still faces the opportunity cost of not sending a persuasive message that focuses on just one of the attributes. However, in equilibrium such messages cannot be too favorable about each attribute since otherwise the seller would never send a more focused message. Hence the classic beer slogan "Tastes great, less filling" can convey that the beer is (slightly) better than expected on both dimensions.
Negative Puffery
We now consider "negative puffery" where the seller of one product highlights a weak attribute of the competitor's product. For instance, a salesperson at one car dealership criticizes a car sold by another dealership, or a negative advertisement by a firm focuses on a weakness of a competing firm's product. For our definition of negative puffery we assume that communication by the seller of product 1 affects buyer estimates of the attributes of product 2 and also, to distinguish it from other forms of puffery, that it has no effect on buyer estimates of product 1. Therefore the equilibrium condition is
for all   0 , where note that ( 11   12 ) is unaffected by the messages. Following previous arguments, even if there are asymmetries in the distributions of  or , Theorem 1 of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) implies that there is an influential cheap talk equilibrium satisfying this condition. Negative puffery pulls away from the competition some buyers who value the criticized attribute, but it also pushes toward the competition some buyers who care more about the non-criticized attribute. It might seem that the net result is positive when the competitor has a large number of likely buyers to pull away, and this is indeed the case. Property (ii) 22 The existence of multi-message equilibria in our environment is implied by Theorem 3 of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010). For the symmetric case, there is always an equilibrium with three messages in which two of the messages indicate the strength of one attribute and the middle message indicates both attributes are similar and better than the prior as Crutzen, Swank, and Visser (2007) show in a different but related model.
shows that  1 is concave-convex in  2 , so any communication that increases the variation in  2 so as to pull in some buyers and push away other buyers helps the seller of good 1 when  2 is large. This can be seen directly for the logit where
The following proposition uses this result on the shape of   in   and Jensen's inequality to show that the seller is better or worse off from negative puffery depending on the competitor's prior probability of a sale. 
. The firm's expected probability of a sale is increasing toward the southwesterly direction, so as seen in the figure negative puffery helps the firm.
Since some of the buyers pushed away from the competitor by negative puffery end up buying neither product, it might seem negative puffery is less effective at gaining customers than directly pushing an attribute of one's own product as in the previous section. In this example negative puffery raises the probability of a sale to only 84% rather than 109% so indeed it is less effective.
Comparative Advantage Puffery
Now suppose the seller makes comparative statements that reveal attribute information about its product and a competitor's product, so that there are four variables about which the seller provides information. We focus on a two message equilibrium that increases product differentiation by simultaneously indicating that one product is relatively better on one attribute, and the other product is relatively better on another attribute.
We define comparative advantage puffery as having two features that distinguish it from other forms of puffery. First, it affects both attributes of each product (and none others more generally), so the equilibrium condition is
Second, each product's expected quality averaged over the uncertain 's is the same for each message,
for  = 1 2. This captures the idea of comparative advantage puffery as affecting only the distribution of attributes but not overall quality. The constraints (7) can be seen as reducing the four dimensions to just two dimensions, so that our previous existence results still apply. More formally, these constraints along with the equilibrium condition generate three equality constraints for our four dimensions of information. Since the number of dimensions exceeds the number of such equality constraints, by Proposition 5 of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010, online appendix) we are assured of an influential equilibrium. From Shape Property (iii) we know that  1 is (strictly) quasiconcave in ( 1   2 ) and, by linearity of   , therefore quasiconcave in ( 1   2 ) for given . This implies that  1 cannot be strictly convex in ( 1   2 ). However, lack of convexity of  1 in the four-dimensional ( 1   2 ) space does not preclude convexity in lower sub-dimensions. Constraint (7) restricts variation to a two-dimensional subspace, and the equilibrium condition further restricts the space to a single dimension. For  1 small enough, we find that  1 is strictly convex along this onedimensional line of variation.
To see this, consider Figure 2 (c) which shows the same situation as in Figure 2 (a-b) except that the seller of product 1 makes statements that buyers interpret as about the comparative advantage of product 1. As shown in the figure, message 1 indicates that product 1 is relatively better at attribute 1 compared to product 2,  11 −  12 ≥  21 −  22 . And message 2 indicates that product 1 is relatively better at attribute 2 compared to product 2,  12 −  11   22 −  21 (or, equivalently, that product 2 is relatively better at attribute 1,
The expected values for the differences are  = ( 11 −  12   21 −  22 ) = (0 0) without communication and
) for messages  = 1 2. The probability of a sale of product 1 increases in either a northwesterly or southeasterly direction as the estimates move away from the prior (0 0), and the two indifference curves through the updated estimates represent the same utility. Even though  1 is not convex over the whole space as seen from the shape of the indifference curves, if we restrict attention to the line joining  1 and  2 which includes the prior  = (0 0), it is convex in this subspace so the probability of a sale of product 1 rises. In this example the probability of a sale more than doubles from 59% without communication to 126% with comparative advertising based on attribute puffery. The following proposition follows the approach from Figure 2 (c) to show how puffery that provides information on the comparative advantage of a product can increase the probability of a sale.
Proposition 3 Puffery of an attribute that is the comparative advantage of product  relative to that of product  always strictly raises (lowers) the expected probability of a sale   if the probability of a sale   () without communication is sufficiently small (large) for all .
This result can help inform the policy debate over when comparative advertising should be encouraged. The Federal Trade Commission has explicitly encouraged comparative advertising about "objectively measurable attributes or price". Just as puffery about subjective attributes of a product can help inform consumers, our results imply that comparative advertising about subjective attributes can be informative as well. In particular, advertising that highlights the comparative advantage of a product can help direct consumers to products that have relative strengths in areas that they value.
Before comparing in more detail these three different forms of puffery that focus on product attributes, suppose that the seller makes statements that push the overall quality of its product or denigrate the overall quality of a competitor's product. Since the firm's incentive is to always push its own product, it might seem that there is no possibility to credibly reveal information through such puffery. In fact, in equilibrium communication is possible, but it involves a tradeoff in which a positive statement about the seller's own product is treated as good news about the competitor's product also, while a negative statement about the competitor's product is treated as bad news about both products. 23 While credible, such communication can lower the probability of a sale for the firm making the comparison. From Theorem 2 of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) the seller is worse off from cheap talk if
for all values where   is linear in   . This implies that, as uncertainty about the buyer's preferences  becomes smaller and  1 () converges to  1 (), puffery that affects the estimated overall quality of both the seller's good and the competitor's good makes the seller worse off. 24 An implication of this result is that our restriction above that comparative advantage puffery leaves overall expected quality unchanged is necessary to ensure that such puffery benefits the seller.
Puffery Forms Compared
When are the different forms of puffery most persuasive? Propositions 1-3 show that puffery is better than no communication (or the babbling equilibrium) when the probability of a sale is low, but these analytic results do not rank the gains from the different forms of puffery. From the numerical results for the example in Figure 2 , comparative advantage puffery was most persuasive, but this result was only for particular parameter values. We now consider this problem further. In our cheap talk environment the same messages can be interpreted in different ways by the buyer, so formally the question is when different equilibria (and hence different equilibrium interpretations of the messages) are most persuasive. 25 The probability simplex in Figure 3 shows the most persuasive equilibrium based on prior expected sale probabilities for the seller and competitor,  1 and  2 , and the probability of no sale,  0 . The calculations use the same example in Figure 2 except that we allow  1 and  2 to have more general support on [   1 +   ] for  = 1 2. The   shift parameters allow the quality ranges for each product to vary and, given that prices and preferences are fixed, fully determine the prior expected probabilities. To allow for direct comparisons of the different forms of puffery, we continue our focus on two-message equilibria that are symmetric in that they divide the relevant state spaces equally through the prior.
Comparative advantage puffery does best in the bottom right region where  1 is low and  2 is high. Since  1 is convex in  1 when  1 is low, and is convex in  2 when  2 is high, revealing information that increases variation in both  1 and  2 helps the seller, which is the feature of comparative advantage puffery. This is the case in the example of Figure  2 where we assume that the competitor is better,
, implying prior probabilities  1 = 59%,  2 = 596%, and  0 = 345%. As indicated the probability of 24 Unlike concavity (or convexity), quasiconcavity need not be preserved by integration, which is why preferences must be sufficiently close to certain in order to ensure quasiconcavity holds in general. In the example used in Figure 2 , numerical analysis finds that preferences do remain quasiconcave despite the uncertainty, so the seller is hurt by communication. 25 In practice, the literal content of the message, e.g., whether it refers to a competitor explicitly or not, is likely to help the seller and buyer infer the intended meaning. Note that in any given equilibrium all seller types receive the same payoff so if one type of seller prefers one equilibrium all seller types prefer it. a sale rises to 109% with attribute puffery, to 84% with negative puffery, and up to 126% with comparative advantage puffery. Attribute puffery does best in the bottom left region where  0 is high so both  1 and  2 are low, in which case  1 is convex in  1 and concave in  2 . With attribute puffery the seller benefits from increased variation in  1 , but unlike comparative advantage puffery avoids a loss from increased variation in  2 . Changing the example from Figure 2 so that the seller and competitor are symmetric,
, implies prior probabilities  1 =  2 = 280% and  0 = 440%. In this case  1 rises to 309% with attribute puffery, falls to 270% with negative puffery, and rises to 300% with comparative advantage puffery.
Finally, no communication (babbling) does best when  1 is high and the seller does not want to risk scaring away likely buyers. Changing the example from Figure 2 so that the seller is better than the competitor,
, the prior probabilities are  1 = 596%,  2 = 59%, and  0 = 345%. In this case  1 falls to 570% with attribute puffery, to 547% with negative puffery, and to 557% with comparative advantage puffery.
We find that negative puffery is never the best strategy. Negative puffery affects  2 so it is most effective when  2 is high, but high  2 implies low  1 , which means the seller is not realizing the gains from revealing information about its own product. Hence, in the one case where negative puffery is desirable, comparative advantage puffery that increases variation in both  1 and  2 does even better.
For concreteness we have focused on shifts in the distributions of attribute quality, but the same effects can be found by varying other parameters. If the competitor has lower costs and can set a lower price, then it will have a higher probability of a sale, which makes comparative advantage puffery more attractive. If there are other common knowledge attributes that make the competitor more popular, then it will have a higher probability of a sale so again comparative advantage puffery is more attractive. The degree of product differentiation can also affect the persuasiveness of different puffery forms. If the seller and competitor are relatively similar in all aspects then both cannot have a high probability of a sale, so attribute puffery may be more attractive. This effect is strengthened if there are many competing products that are all ex ante similar, in which case the probability of a sale for the seller and for any given competitor will both be low, thereby favoring attribute puffery that focuses on the seller's own product.
Since the model follows the random coefficients discrete choice framework used throughout marketing and economics, standard numeric methods can be used to check the effects of puffery in any given situation. The model can also be readily extended in a number of directions, some of which we pursue in the following section.
Extensions and Applications

Buyer Privacy and Pandering
These results on the persuasiveness of puffery are under the assumption that the seller does not know the buyer's exact preferences. Since the buyer's preferences  are not known, the tradeoff from pushing one attribute at the expense of another is not exact for each buyer -some buyers end up with a higher  1 and some buyers with a lower  1 , which increases variation in  1 and allows puffery to be persuasive. If the  coefficients are known, then the seller has an incentive to pretend that whatever attribute the buyer cares more about is the product's strength. Anticipating such pandering, the buyer discounts such claims so that the seller receives a correspondingly smaller gain from pushing that attribute. In equilibrium the tradeoff must be exact so that  1 is the same for each message, since otherwise the seller would always choose whatever message induced the higher  1 . But then, even though the buyer learns some information about the attributes, the buyer's decision is completely unaffected.
and comparative advantage puffery.
Proposition 4 Attribute puffery, negative puffery, and comparative advantage puffery influence buyer behavior if and only if the buyer's preferences  are the buyer's private information.
Since influential communication that benefits both the buyer and the seller is only possible if a buyer can conceal her relative preferences for different attributes from the seller, this result offers insight into why buyers (and other decision makers) might value privacy. The buyer may also have an incentive to conceal the overall strength of her preferences -the seller prefers not to communicate attribute information to a buyer who is already likely to purchase the product, so a buyer with a strong interest in a product should try to feign lack of interest so as to encourage more information from the seller.
The effect of buyer privacy on influential communication is particularly relevant for online advertising due to the increasing ability to customize and target advertisements based on consumer preferences. If a seller learns information about which buyers care more about which product attributes, and can target buyers accordingly with different advertisements emphasizing different strengths of the product, then the credibility of advertisements is undermined to the detriment of both buyer and seller. 27 This argument on privacy and targeting only applies to an individual advertiser selling one good. Unlike an advertiser of a single product, an advertising platform such as Google Ads benefits from generating consumer interest in multiple different products. Hence the display of an ad for a particular product can be seen as an implicit recommendation that, based on the platform's information on both the product and the consumer's preferences, the product is likely to be a good match. As is already known in the literature, such recommendations can be credible and beneficial to all parties even when they are pure cheap talk. 28 Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) find that online advertisements are more effective when they can be targeted using consumer information, which is consistent with the platform using its information to effectively recommend products. 27 Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2003) consider buyer communication to a seller and find that the buyer has an incentive to mislead the seller about the strength of her preferences for different goods. 
Endogenous Prices
We have shown that pure cheap talk can influence buyer behavior even when the seller's price is fixed. 29 The assumption of fixed prices fits many cases of direct salesperson communication to a buyer, it allows the results to be compared with experimental research in marketing that uses fixed prices, and it also allows the model to be applied to other persuasion environments without explicit prices, such as managerial communication within a firm or political communication. However, the assumption is less appropriate for other situations such as large advertising campaigns where the firm might adjust prices based on its effect on demand. Incorporation of price changes is straightforward for the monopoly case. We assume that the seller first communicates via puffery and then adjusts the price based on the equilibrium distribution of buyer valuations induced by the message. For the simplest case of symmetric distributions of attribute qualities and preferences, in a two-message equilibrium the distribution of demand is exactly the same from either message so the prices will be the same as well. With more messages, or asymmetries, the prices will differ. However, assuming that buyers do not interpret any unexpected deviations from the equilibrium price as information about product attributes, the model is essentially the same with the only difference that the seller's payoffs need to incorporate the gains from adjusting the price.
Proposition 5
If the seller first communicates via puffery and then sets the price  1 , attribute puffery, negative puffery, and comparative advantage puffery all increase seller profits if the probability of a sale  1 () is sufficiently small for all .
The additional gain to the seller from adjusting the price implies that, contrary to the fixed price case, the seller might still benefit from puffery when the probability of a sale is high. As is known from verifiable information games, information which changes the demand curve so as to lower quantity demanded at a given price can still increase profits if the smaller group of buyers is willing to pay a sufficiently higher price (Lewis and Sappington, 1992; Justin and Myatt, 2006). If we consider strategic price responses by multiple firms, the same approach can be applied in which cheap talk is preplay communication before the pricing game. As long as there is a unique equilibrium of the pricing game which changes continuously with the buyer attribute estimates, then the firm which is communicating will still have a payoff function that is continuous in the estimates, so the same results on the credibility of cheap talk can be applied. The main difference is that price changes by the other firm can affect the gains or losses from puffery. If the distributions of attributes and coefficients are symmetric, then puffery provides information that effectively implies greater product differentiation, so we would expect puffery to lead to higher prices that increase the gains to the firm but decrease the gains to consumers. However, in asymmetric environments this need not be the case. For instance, if comparative advantage puffery leads the larger firm to lower its price, any gains to the smaller firm from such puffery might be counteracted by having to lower its price in response. 30 Hence the effect of puffery on price setting by multiple firms is an open question.
In addition to adjusting their prices, other strategic responses are likely that require further analysis. First, other firms might also engage in puffery. If firms only have information about their own products, the same tools we use in this paper can be applied. If they share the same information the game becomes one of multi-sender cheap talk and a different approach is required. Such cheap talk has been analyzed in the literature with statedependent preferences (Battaglini, 2002), but not in our environment of state-independent preferences. 31 Second, the ability to communicate attribute information should change the incentives of firms to invest in product attributes, and particularly might induce them to focus their investments on different strengths. Johnson and Myatt (2006) consider such product design issues when product information can be revealed to buyers, while Kalra and Li (2008) show how firms can signal quality through specialization. Finally, we also expect that the equilibrium number of firms in the market will adjust along with changes in firm profitability. 30 Anderson and Renault (2009) find such a pattern can arise in their model of comparative advertising with verifiable information, but the smaller firm still benefits overall. 31 A complication with multiple senders in some contexts such as online reviews is that buyers might not know which sender is the source of a message. Mayzlin (2006) shows that (costly) seller claims can be persuasive when buyers are unsure of their source.
Puffery versus Disclosure
We have analyzed persuasion via puffery about "soft information" whereas most of the literature on seller communication has emphasized persuasion via disclosure of verifiable "hard information". When there is no way to verify information, puffery is the only method by which communication can occur. It might seem that the seller is always better off when there is hard evidence available about a product's quality, but this is not the case. With hard information standard "unraveling" arguments imply that a seller will be compelled in equilibrium to reveal all information, even if it is quite unfavorable (e.g., Milgrom, 1981) . 32 Therefore, even if a seller benefits on average from revealing information, some seller types will win while others will lose. In contrast, when puffery benefits the seller it benefits all types of sellers regardless of whether their private information is favorable or not, so some sellers who would be hurt by disclosure of hard information are helped by puffery about soft information. For instance, in the example of Figure 2 (a), types below the indifference curve through  1 = (12 12), which includes all types ( 1   2 )  (12 12), are hurt by full disclosure while every type benefits from puffery. Perhaps more surprisingly, the coarse partition of the seller's information revealed by puffery is sometimes preferable on average for the firm to both no information disclosure and full information disclosure. As an example, consider a version of the model where a single firm sells two products, e.g., a restaurant has two dishes that the customer can choose only one of. The utility from dish  of the firm ( = 1) is    1 −  1 +  1 where   = 10 and  1 = 5. Assuming that  11 =  12 so that the error terms are perfectly correlated and that they follow the Gumbel distribution, the model is a nested logit and the probability of a sale is  1 ( 11   12 ) =  10 max{ 11  12 }−5 (1 +  10 max{ 11  12 }−5 ). 33 Notice that we are assuming fixed coefficients so  1 ≡  1 . Since the max function is convex this is no longer a linear model and there is an incentive from this convexity to disclose information even without random coefficients. In particular, since increasing functions of convex functions are quasiconvex,  1 is quasiconvex in ( 11   12 ) even in the region where  1 is concave in  1 . Therefore, by Theorem 2 of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010), cheap talk can always benefit the seller. Assuming  11 and  12 are i.i.d. uniform on [0 1] as before, without any communication  11 =  12 = 12 so the customer randomly picks a dish and the probability of a sale 32 Milgrom considered one-dimensional information. In our model where the seller's payoff is monotonic in each attribute the same unraveling logic applies. Koessler and Renault (2012) analyze general conditions under which full revelation of (multidimensional) information occurs in equilibrium. 33 Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) consider a closely related model in Section II.A.
If the restaurant pushes its best dish, which it can do credibly by the same arguments as before, then max{ 11  12 } = 23 and the probability of a sale is
With full disclosure of the qualities of each dish the ex ante expected probability of a sale is R 1 0 R 1 0  10 max{ 11  12 }−5 (1 +  10 max{ 11  12 }−5 ) 11  12 = 719 so the seller is worse off in expectation from full disclosure (when it is possible) than from partial disclosure via puffery. Since puffery of the better dish has already raised the probability of a sale up into the region where  1 is concave in  11 and  12 , further disclosure of information would hurt on average. This example and the quasiconvexity result prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose, contrary to the linear model, that  1 is strictly quasiconvex in ( 11   12 ) for all  1 . Then partial disclosure via puffery is always persuasive even when  1 is concave in  1 and can be more persuasive than full disclosure.
This result is related to the literature on optimal disclosure policies. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show in a one-dimensional environment that partial disclosure can outperform full disclosure when the sender can commit to withholding information and the sender's payoff has both convex and non-convex regions. In our multi-dimensional environment, partial disclosure can also do better than full disclosure. Moreover, communication via cheap talk does not require a commitment to withhold information -to the contrary it is always credible to reveal some information but never credible to reveal all information.
Additional Attributes
We have focused on the case where the seller only has private information on two attributes of its product and possibly the corresponding attributes of a competitor's product. Typically there will be many attributes of a product that the seller has private information about, and the model is readily generalizable to this case. In the symmetric case where the distributions of the coefficients on each attribute are identical, similar results as from Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) can be applied to show that a complete ranking of the different attribute values is credible. For instance, a buyer might infer the ranking from the relative amount of time the seller devotes to multiple different attributes. As the number of attributes increases such a rank revealing equilibrium reveals more and more information and in the limit is equivalent to full disclosure.
If the distributions are too asymmetric to apply the above result, the case of more than two attributes can be analyzed in essentially the same way as the two-attribute case. Even if these other attributes are correlated, it is still possible to puff up one of the attributes at the expense of any of the other attributes. In addition one can consider any combination of attributes as itself an attribute that the seller has information about. So it becomes possible to highlight one attribute or one group of attributes as better than the average of the other attributes. Analysis of negative puffery and comparative advantage puffery can be similarly extended.
Message Space Constraints
We find that for unverifiable information it is often only credible and persuasive to push one attribute. Separate from this credibility constraint, there might also be constraints on the message space. For instance, there might be a "bandwidth" constraint that limits the seller's ability to provide information, e.g., there might be sufficient time to discuss only one attribute with a customer, or sufficient space to highlight only one attribute in an advertisement. In a verifiable message game, such constraints can have a large effect on equilibrium communication (Mayzlin and Shin, 2011 ). 34 In a simple two-message equilibrium the bandwidth constraint can be seen as forcing the seller to focus on only one attribute, but the constraint is not binding since in equilibrium the seller does that anyway. In practice the constraint might facilitate communication by highlighting the tradeoff that the seller faces between pushing one attribute or another. A bandwidth constraint might also facilitate communication when there is a multi-message equilibrium in which different messages push one attribute over the other to greater or lesser degrees. The amount of time or space that is devoted to one attribute over another might naturally be interpreted by buyers as indicating the relative strengths of the attributes.
Given the role that message constraints might play in highlighting the comparative nature of equilibrium communication, it might be desirable to restrict the message space so as to explicitly emphasize comparative messages. For instance, a problem with product rating websites is fake reviews that promote a firm's product or denigrate a competitor's product (Mayzlin, Chevalier, and Dover, 2012) . While these websites sometimes allow users to rate the product on different attributes, e.g., hotel cleanliness and hotel comfort, the format does not encourage comparative cheap talk. If instead of rating a product from 1-5 on each attribute, suppose the user were forced to rank the relative strengths and weaknesses of the product, e.g., allocate only one "5", one "4", one "3", etc. to the different attributes.
Since communication would then be comparative, even "fake" reviews by the seller could credibly emphasize the product's relative strengths. This is related to the idea that, when there is ambiguity over how to interpret messages, "two-sided arguments" that acknowledge weakness on one attribute can make the comparative meaning explicit.
Extreme Exaggerations
Puffery sometimes takes the form of extreme exaggerations, such as "world's best coffee". In our model such a claim can be interpreted as an implied comparison of the relative quality of a store's coffee and its doughnuts, but the model does not formally differentiate between such a claim and other statements that also provide comparative information. A standard explanation for extreme claims is that they gain attention for their shock value or amusement value (Hoffman, 2006) . Another explanation is that they are "metamessages" that make the cheap talk nature of the statement more apparent to buyers and the courts (Parmentier, 1994) .
Extreme messages appear to be more common in advertising than in direct salesperson communication. Presumably a salesperson already has the buyer's attention so the need to grab attention with extreme claims is less. And a salesperson engaged in verbal communication has less to worry about legal scrutiny so the need to establish a puffery defense is also weaker. Our model does not analyze these factors, but adds to the existing explanations in showing that extreme claims can also provide comparative information.
Conclusion
These results show how seller puffery can be surprisingly informative and can potentially benefit both buyers and sellers. Previous research has found that puffery is often believed by consumers, which is interpreted as evidence that buyers are credulous and hurt by puffery. From the perspective of the analysis in this paper, the question is whether consumers adjust their interpretation of seller puffery to account for the seller's incentives. There is evidence of this from advertising studies which show that buyers do not just raise their opinion of product attributes that are featured in an advertisement, but they also lower their opinion of attributes that are not featured. If buyers do make such adjustments then puffery provides them with information that helps them make a better decision and they are better off on average from puffery than from no communication.
Following the definition of puffery as being about subjective "soft information", we model puffery as a cheap talk game. The implications are very different from seller communication based on persuasion games with objective "hard information". As shown early on in the literature on persuasion games, if sellers are not allowed to lie about objective information then in equilibrium they should voluntarily reveal information to consumers. Therefore restrictions on the ability to exaggerate play a central role in reducing information asymmetries about hard information. In our model with subjective information where statements cannot be verified or falsified we show that allowing sellers some freedom to make unverifiable claims can still help reduce information asymmetries. Hence the distinction between cheap talk and persuasion games is consistent with the legal emphasis on allowing puffery for subjective information but restricting it for objective information.
Much of the policy debate over seller puffery has focused on how exactly to draw the line between subjective statements that sellers can make without proof and objective statements that require proof. When there is confusion over whether a statement is subjective or objective, even sophisticated buyers might believe puffery without adjusting for seller incentives. 35 In practice some consumers are likely to make such adjustments and some are not, so the net effect of puffery on buyer welfare depends on whether the gains from puffery to more sophisticated consumers outweigh the losses from puffery to more credulous consumers. Further research on how consumers react to puffery, and how heterogeneity in consumer responses affects equilibrium communication, is necessary for a more complete understanding of the role of puffery in seller communication. Since we follow a standard discrete choice model that is widely used in the empirical analysis of consumer choice, our theoretical predictions can be readily tested using experimental and field data.
Appendix
Proof of Shape Properties: Generalizing from the logit, the probability that product  = 1   will be consumed is 35 Credulousness is analyzed by Morgan and Stocken (2003) and Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) . Alternatively, consumers may be so skeptical of seller claims that they treat even "objective" information as puffery and adjust accordingly. Most claims that are classified as objective turn out not to be supported by evidence (Preston, 1996) .
Then, for  6 = ,
so that   is decreasing in   . Prekopa (1973) shows that if a function ( ) is logconcave in ( ) then R ( ) is logconcave in . Applying this result to the above function, since  is logconcave and hence so is  , and since products of logconcave functions are logconcave, the product (
Hence  is logconcave in   and so unimodal in   . If the mode is infinite, then   is either a strictly decreasing globally concave or a strictly decreasing globally convex function of   , in either case a contradiction with the fact that   is a probability and so bounded in [0 1]. We conclude that  has a finite mode   in   (that possibly depends on  − ) so that   is strictly concave in   for      and strictly convex in   for      . This proves part (ii). Using this result on the shape of   in   we can now use this to determine the shape of   in   (or, equivalently,   in   ). Since   = 1 − P 6 =   we conclude that   is an increasing function of   which is strictly convex in   for   sufficiently small and strictly convex in   for   sufficiently large. This proves part (i).
For part (iii), note that each term (8) is logconcave in ( ). Therefore, by the same result of Prekopa (1973) used above, the probability   () is logconcave in  and hence quasiconcave. ¤ Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that for all possible  1 the probability of a sale is sufficiently low that  1 () is convex in  1 as established in Shape Property (i). In equilibrium, from (4) the expected probability of a sale  1 (  1   2 ) is the same for any message   .
Consequently, the payoff from attribute puffery is
where  1 () is the expected probability of a sale without communication. For the inequality we use the strict convexity of  1 , Jensen's inequality and the full dimensionality assumption for the random coefficients . Even though the expected probability of a sale is equal across messages, as required in equilibrium, the full dimensionality assumption guarantees that the arguments   1 are not identical (except for a zero measure of ) whenever the estimates   1 are different across messages. The opposite inequality obtains if all possible  lie in the region where the probability of sale is sufficiently high that  1 is strictly concave. ¤ Proof of Proposition 2: From Shape Property (ii),  1 is a decreasing function of  2 that is strictly concave for  2 sufficiently low and strictly convex otherwise. The result then follows from arguments analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3:
Recall that we restrict the equilibrium to satisfy [ 
and similarly,
For any given  and real number , and each  = 1 2, define   ( ) =   + (
. Consider now the probability of a sale of product 1 given  as a function of ,
where the function  has been defined and its properties described in the Shape Properties proof. Using these properties, we conclude that  1 is strictly convex in  for a sufficiently low probability of a sale in which case, using arguments identical to those in the proof of Proposition 1, we conclude that the equilibrium probability of a sale is greater than that with no communication. Similar arguments complete the proof for when  1 is strictly concave in . ¤ Proof of Proposition 4: Propositions 1, 2, and 3 have already shown sufficiency. For necessity, suppose instead the 's are common knowledge. For attribute puffery, the equilibrium condition (4) simplifies to
implying  1  So the probability of a sale with any cheap talk message is the same as the prior probability,
For negative puffery (5) simplifies to
which combined with the identity 
The restrictions (7) simplify to
which combined with the identities
imply
for  = 1 2, so again  1 is the same as the prior for all messages. ¤ Proof of Proposition 5: Let  1 ( 1  ) be the expected probability of a sale given price  1 and estimates . Let  * 1 () be the maximand of
where  1 is constant unit costs and let Π * 1 () =  1 ( * 1 () ) ( * 1 () −  1 ) be maximized profits. We wish to show Π * 1 () is strictly convex (and hence strictly quasi-convex) in  over subsets of the four-dimensional  space as restricted by puffery.
Let  ∈ (0 1) and   0 be any two distinct estimates satisfying the attribute puffery restriction that  2 is fixed. As shown in Proposition 1, for  1 () sufficiently small  1 is convex in  under this restriction. Then
where the first inequality follows from the definition of  * 1 (note that this inequality is strict if  * 1 is unique) and the second inequality follows from the strict convexity of  1 . Identical arguments apply for the negative puffery restriction that  1 is fixed, and for the comparative advantage puffery restriction that variation in ( 1   2 ) is restricted by (7) . ¤
